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Abstract
Across a wide variety of situations, exposure to anchors has been shown to bias people’s estimates. What is not 
known, however, is whether externally provided anchors influence the confidence that people have in their 
estimates. Our studies had two goals. First, we tested whether exposure to anchors influenced people’s subjective 
confidence levels (Studies 1 and 2). These studies revealed that people who made estimates after making 
comparisons with externally provided anchors tended to be more confident in their estimates than people who did 
not see anchors. The second goal was to test two explanations as to why anchors increase people’s confidence. In 
Study 3, we tested the explanation that anchors increase confidence because participants thought the anchors 
provided useful information. In Study 4, we tested the explanation that exposure to anchors causes people to 
consider a narrower range of plausible values as compared to when not exposed to anchors. Support was found 
only for the explanation that comparisons with anchors increase confidence because people who are exposed to 
anchors consider a narrower range of plausible values. Taken together, these studies reveal the powerful influence 
anchors can have—they not only bias estimates, but also increase people’s confidence in their biased estimates.
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People often make numeric estimates. For example, a doctor
might either explicitly or implicitly estimate the likelihood
that his patient has a pulmonary embolism. Or, a professor
might estimate how long it will take her to grade her
students’ papers. The confidence that people have in their
estimates is likely to influence their later decisions and
behavior. For example, should the doctor hospitalize the
patient or wait to see if the patient’s condition improves?
Should the professor agree to attend the departmental
party now or wait to see how long it takes to grade the
papers? Given the importance of people’s subjective confi-
dence,1 in their numeric estimates, it is critical that we
understand the factors that can exert an influence on their
confidence.2
A pervasive influence on people’s numeric estimates is
values—or anchors—encountered before people provide
their estimate. A large body of research has demonstrated
that estimates tend to be biased by numeric anchors (e.g.,
Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring effects—i.e., the
assimilation of estimates toward previously considered
values—have been observed in many different situations.
For example, Chapman and Bornstein (1996) found that
mock jurors tended to give larger damages awards when
plaintiffs asked for more money. Anchoring effects have also
been observed across a wide variety of people. For example,
experts and novices both tend to exhibit anchoring effects
(Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Northcraft & Neale,
1987). However, it does appear to be the case that more
knowledgeable people are less influenced by anchors (Smith
& Windschitl, 2015; Smith, Windschitl, & Bruchmann,
2013) and that people exhibit smaller anchoring effects when
they gain more experience (Mussweiler & Englich, 2003).
While a large amount of research has demonstrated that
anchors can bias people’s estimates, it is not known whether
comparisons with externally provided anchors can influence
the subjective confidence that people have in their estimates.
Consider, for example, the demonstration that the plaintiff’s
request influenced mock juror’s damages awards (Chapman
& Bornstein, 1996; see also Marti & Wissler, 2000). It is
possible that the money requested (i.e., the anchor) not only
biased the mock jurors’ estimates, but also influenced their
subjective feelings of confidence that they awarded the
2In this and the other studies, we decided on our target sample sizes before
the studies began by considering issues related to power, monetary concerns
(for the studies conducted using MTurk), and time factors. Furthermore, we
have reported all conditions and measures in the description of our studies.
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1We use the term subjective confidence in order to distinguish our studies 
from research on overconfidence. Studies investigating overconfidence gen-
erally have participants make judgments with objectively correct answers. 
For example, participants might answer 20 multiple-choice questions and 
then estimate the number that they correctly answered. Or, participants 
might be asked to estimate a quantity (e.g., the height of the Empire State 
Building) and provide 90% confidence intervals. In both contexts, people 
tend to be overconfident. Specifically, they overestimate their performance 
and give confidence intervals that are too narrow (for a review, see Moore 
& Healy, 2008). While the research on overconfidence is quite important, 
we focused our studies on participants’ subjective feelings of confidence 
in their estimates. This decision was made because there are many impor-
tant domains where there is no objectively correct response. For example, 
how much money should a plaintiff be awarded for pain and suffering, 
how long should a criminal be sentenced to jail, how much is seller’s house 
worth, or how much money should I ask for when negotiating my salary?
In these contexts, because there is no objectively correct response, it is 
not possible to evaluate whether people are more confident than they should 
be (i.e., there is no objectively correct level of confidence), but it is still 
possible to evaluate factors that increase or decrease their subjecting 
feelings of confidence.
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dimension. Most importantly, we also assume that anchors
cause people’s ranges to narrow, as compared to people
who do not see anchors. For example, someone not exposed
to an anchor might assume that damages awards could be in
the $10 000–$150000 range. Because this person is consid-
ering a much wider range of values (a signal of uncertainty),
he likely would not be as confident as people who consider a
more narrow range of values.
Finally, it is worth noting that it is possible that people
who are biased by anchors would be less confident than
people not exposed to anchors. Recently, De Neys,
Cromheeke, and Osman (2011) had participants answer a
number of base-rate problems and then indicate their confi-
dence in their answer. When the base-rates conflicted with
descriptions (e.g., 995 people in a group are 40 years old
and 5 are 16 years old. Els likes techno music, loves to dance,
and has a nose piercing. Is Els more likely 16 or 40?), partic-
ipants tended to give estimates that were in line with the
descriptions, largely ignoring the base-rates (e.g., reporting
that Els is more likely to be 16 than 40). However, as com-
pared to when base rates and descriptions did not conflict,
people were less confident in their decisions than when the
base-rates and descriptions conflicted. The authors suggest
that the decrease in confidence occurred because people
likely had some awareness that they were giving biased judg-
ments and adjusted their confidence accordingly. With
regards to the current studies, if people recognized that their
estimates were biased by the anchors they might be less con-
fident than people who gave unbiased estimates (i.e., people
who did not see an anchor).
Current studies
Our studies had two primary goals. The first goal was to test
whether anchors influence confidence. As described earlier,
our prediction was that anchors would increase people’s con-
fidence in their estimates. Our prediction was partially based
on the results of a study by Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995).
In the first part of this study, students provided estimates to
numerous questions and, after each estimate, indicated their
confidence in their estimate. Jacowitz and Kahneman used
the estimates from this calibration group to derive the an-
chors used for participants in the experimental group. In the
second part of the study, participants in the experimental
group indicated whether the target value was higher or lower
than a provided anchor, estimated the target value, and then
indicated their confidence in their estimate. When comparing
the confidence of the calibration group to the confidence of
the experimental group, the researchers found that the exper-
imental group (i.e., those participants who saw the anchors)
was more confident than the calibration group.
While this certainly supports the notion that anchors can
increase confidence, it is important to point out that these
two conditions were run at separate times so participants
were not randomly assigned to conditions. It is possible that
the difference between the calibration and experimental
groups results because of selection effects (e.g., differences
in dispositional levels of confidence for students who sign
appropriate amount of money. We contend that exposure to 
externally provided anchors will not only bias people’s esti-
mates, but also increase their subjective feelings of confi-
dence in their biased estimates.
There are at least two reasons why comparisons with an-
chors might increase people’s confidence in their estimates. 
The first is that people might assume that the anchor provides 
some useful information (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995). For 
example, if a juror sees that a plaintiff is requesting $50 000 
as compensation for pain and suffering, the juror might 
assume that the value being requested was generated after a 
careful consideration of other similar cases. The amount 
being requested, therefore, might be assumed to provide some 
useful information when estimating how much the plaintiff 
should receive.
More generally, if people assume the anchor is useful, it 
follows that being provided with more information (the an-
chor) would lead people to be more confident in their estimate 
than being provided with less information (not seeing the 
anchor). To test the idea that increases in information lead 
to increases in confidence, Tsai, Klayman, and Hastie 
(2008) had participants predict the winner of numerous col-
lege football games after being given information about the 
two teams. As the amount of information the participants 
received increased, so did their confidence that they had 
correctly predicted the winning team. This increase in confi-
dence, however, was not warranted. Participants’ accuracy 
did not increase nearly as much as their confidence (see also, 
Hall, Ariss, & Todorov, 2007).
The second way that anchors might increase confidence is 
that being exposed to an anchor could reduce the range of 
possible values that people consider. For example, a juror 
who sees that a plaintiff is requesting $50 000 might consider 
values in the range of $40 000–$60 000 as possible awards 
for the plaintiff. On the other hand, a juror who is not told 
how much the plaintiff is requesting might consider values 
from $10 000 to $100 000 as possible awards for the plaintiff. 
Presumably, this latter juror will be less confident in her 
recommended award amount because she considered such a 
wide range of values.
This explanation is partially derived from Mussweiler and 
Strack’s (2000a); see also, Mussweiler and Strack (1999, 
2000b) explanation of how knowledge plays a role in an-
choring effects. Mussweiler and Strack explain that the esti-
mate that people provide about a target likely represents 
one value that is within a range of many possible values. 
The value that people provide as their estimate will be the 
number with the highest perceived plausibility rating. Impor-
tantly, people’s ranges of possible values are influenced by 
their background knowledge and contextual information. If, 
for example, they have knowledge that damages awards are 
generally in the $10 000–$50 000 range, they will consider 
values within this range. On the other hand, if they have 
knowledge that damages awards are generally in the
$100 000–$150 000 range, they will consider values within 
this range. Presumably, anchors can influence people’s range 
of possible values. That is, low anchors will cause people to 
have ranges lower on a given dimension and high anchors 
will cause people to have ranges higher on a given
the no-anchor condition were told that the plaintiff was ask-
ing for “a monetary award”, participants in the low-anchor
condition were told she was asking for $50 000, and partici-
pants in the high-anchor condition were told she was asking
for $5 000 000. After reading the information about the case,
the participants were asked how much money they would
recommend the plaintiff receive for her pain and suffering.
Next, the participants were asked to indicate their confidence
that the amount they recommended was “…a reasonable
amount of money for cases involving the plaintiff’s level of
pain and suffering.” The participants indicated their confi-
dence on a sliding scale with labels anchored by “Not at all
confident” to “Extremely confident”. Responses were scored
from 0 to 100, although no numeric values were present on
the response scale. Finally, the participants indicated their
age and gender, and were debriefed.
Results
Confidence
Before testing our prediction that exposure to an anchor
would increase confidence, we examined whether the
participants’ confidence varied across those who saw the
high (M=76.41, SD=22.43) and low anchor (M=79.49,
SD=20.43)—it did not, t(161) =0.92, p= .36, d=0.14.
Therefore, we combined participants in the high and low
anchor conditions. Our primary analysis concerns whether
seeing an anchor influences confidence. Consistent with our
prediction, participants who were exposed to an anchor
(M=77.87, SD=21.50) were more confident in their recom-
mendation than participants who were not exposed to an
anchor (M=58.22, SD=29.90), t(317) = 6.76, p< .001,
d=0.77.
Next, we performed an ANCOVA on participants’ confi-
dence estimates while controlling for age and gender. As
before, participants were more confident if they saw an
anchor as compared to those who did not see an anchor,
F(1, 314) = 45.17, p< .001, ηp2 = .126. Gender was not a sig-
nificant covariate, F(1, 314) = 0.14, p= .71, ηp2 = .00, but age
was a significant covariate, F(1, 314) = 7.41, p= .007,
ηp2 = .023—participants’ confidence increased as age
increased.
Anchoring effects
To evaluate whether participants’ recommendations were
biased by the anchors, we compared the recommendation
estimates given by participants in the low, high, and no-
anchor conditions. Estimates from five participants (1.57%
of the estimates) were dropped because they were more than
3 standard deviations above the mean estimate.3 A one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that the anchor
condition did influence participants’ estimates, F(2, 311) =
17.80, p< .001, ηp2 = .103. Follow-up contrasts revealed that
participants in the high anchor condition (M=2535924,
3In this and the other studies, including extreme values did not significantly
impact the results of the analyses conducted.
up for studies early vs. late in a given semester). Studies 1 
and 2 were designed to address this concern by randomly 
assigning participants to either be exposed to anchors or 
not see any anchors. To preview our results, we found sup-
port for our prediction that anchors would increase partici-
pants’ confidence in their estimates.
Finding support for our hypothesis, we next addressed our 
second goal: testing two explanations for how externally 
provided anchors might increase confidence. Study 3 tested 
the explanation that the anchors increased confidence 
because participants assumed the anchors were informative 
to their estimates. Study 4 tested the explanation that anchors 
increase confidence because they reduce the range of values 
that people consider to be plausible estimates of the target.
STUDY 1
In Study 1, participants were asked to imagine being a juror 
at a trial where the plaintiff was suing the defendant for dam-
ages. After reading the specifics of the case, the participants 
indicated how much money they would recommend 
awarding the plaintiff. Importantly, some participants were 
told how much the plaintiff was requesting (i.e., they were 
shown an anchor) while other participants were not given 
this information (i.e., they did not see an anchor). After pro-
viding their estimate, the participants indicated their confi-
dence in the value they recommended. We predicted that 
participants who were exposed to the anchor would be more 
confident in their recommendation than participants who 
were not exposed to the anchor.
Participants and design
Three-hundred and nineteen people (34.8% female, 65.2%
male; Mage = 32.22, SDage = 11.08) from the U.S. were re-
cruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They received
$0.50 as compensation for their participation. Participants 
were randomly assigned to the anchor or no-anchor condition. 
Of those assigned to the anchor condition, half were 
randomly assigned to see a high anchor and half to see a 
low anchor.
Materials and procedure
The participants were first given a brief overview of their 
task; they were told they would read information about a 
court case and should imagine they were a juror. Next, they 
were presented with a scenario adapted from one previously 
used by Chapman and Bornstein (1996). The scenario de-
scribed a case where the plaintiff was suing the defendant 
for pain and suffering resulting from being prescribed birth-
control pills that presumably caused ovarian cancer (see Ap-
pendix A for the complete scenario). The scenario explained 
that the defendant had already been found guilty of know-
ingly prescribing unsafe pills; the question at hand was 
how much money the plaintiff should be awarded for her 
emotional and physical pain and suffering. Participants in
Method
Participants and design
One-hundred and ninety-three people (37.3% female, 62.7%
male; Mage = 30.76, SDage = 9.19) from the U.S. were
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They received
$0.50 as compensation for their participation. Participants
were randomly assigned to the anchor or no-anchor
condition.
Materials
Participants answered six question sets (see Appendix B).
Each question set contained a comparative question that
introduced the anchor (e.g., “Do you think there are more
or less than 350 calories in a Twinkie?”), an absolute esti-
mate (e.g., “How many calories are in a Twinkie?”), and a
confidence question (e.g., “How confident are you that your
estimate is within 10% of the actual number of calories in a
Twinkie?”). Participants responded to the confidence ques-
tion on a 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (extremely confident)
Likert-type response scale. For the participants in the anchor
condition, half of the questions used high anchors and half
used low anchors.
Procedure
After agreeing to participate, the participants were given
initial instructions about the basics of their task. The instruc-
tions also explained that they might compare the target to a
value and that this value was randomly determined and
therefore “completely arbitrary.” Next, the participants went
through an instructions check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, &
Davidenko, 2009). 4The participants were then informed that
after they answered each question, they would indicate their
confidence that their estimate was within 10% of the actual
answer. They were given detailed information to ensure they
understood what “within 10%” meant (see Appendix C for
the exact instructions). The participants then saw each of
the six question sets in a randomized order. Participants in
the anchor condition saw the comparative question that in-
cluded the anchor value, provided their absolute estimate,
and then indicated their confidence in the accuracy of their
estimate. Participants in the no-anchor condition provided
an absolute estimate and then indicated their confidence in
their estimate.
After answering the six question sets, the participants
completed the 11 problem-solving confidence questions of
the Problem-Solving Inventory (Heppner & Petersen,
4The instructions check involved a question asking how often the partici-
pants went to the gym in an average week with a short paragraph of instruc-
tions above the question. The instructions informed the participant to ignore
the question. Furthermore, the participants were instructed that they should
not look up any of the answers to the questions as we were interested in what
they knew, not what they could look up. To indicate that they read the in-
structions, the participants were asked to type “I will not look up any infor-
mation when answering the questions in this survey” into a text field. The
instructions check served two purposes: 1) we could identify participants
who did not read the instructions and 2) we reinforced the idea that the par-
ticipants were not to look up any information about the questions they were
asked.
SD = 2 126 960) gave higher recommendations than 
participants in the no-anchor condition (M = 1 461 435, 
SD = 2 773 673), t(311) = 3.43, p = .001. Participants in the 
low-anchor condition (M = 366 494, SD = 1 193 091) gave 
lower estimates than participants in the no-anchor condi-
tion, t(311) = 3.40, p = .001. In short, comparisons with a 
high anchor caused participants to give higher estimates 
and comparisons with low anchors caused participants to 
give lower estimates than participants not exposed to an 
anchor.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 clearly indicate that exposure to exter-
nally provided anchors increased participants’ confidence as 
compared to people who did not see the anchors—a finding 
consistent with the study conducted by Jacowitz and 
Kahneman (1995). Our study builds on their findings by 
demonstrating the effect when participants were randomly 
assigned to the anchor vs. no-anchor condition.
Consistent with previous research on anchoring effects, 
comparisons with anchors biased participants’ estimates. 
Participants who saw a high anchor gave higher estimates 
than participants not exposed to an anchor; participants 
who saw a low anchor gave lower estimates than participants 
not exposed to an anchor. Taken together, the results of 
Study 1 demonstrate that anchors biased participants’ 
estimates but also increased the confidence they had in their 
biased estimates.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we extended the findings of Study 1 to a different 
domain—general knowledge questions. This was done to ad-
dress a possible limitation of Study 1. Specifically, in Study 
1, there was no objectively correct amount of money the 
plaintiff should be awarded. Therefore, it was not possible 
for us to say whether the increase in confidence by partici-
pants in the anchor conditions was unwarranted. In Study 
2, each of the questions had an objectively correct response.
A second change in Study 2 was that the anchors were 
described as random and arbitrary. In Study 1, participants 
might have viewed the anchor value (i.e., the plaintiff’s 
request) as useful when coming up with their award recom-
mendation. Given that these participants had more informa-
tion, perhaps an increase in confidence was warranted. To 
minimize the perceived usefulness or informativeness of the 
anchor values, the anchors in Study 2 were described as hav-
ing been randomly generated and completely arbitrary.
A third change was to move from the context of a decision 
to a judgment. Specifically, in Study 1 the participants made 
a decision (i.e., their recommended award amount) while in 
Study 2, participants made numerous judgments (see Yates 
& Potworowski, 2012 for a description of judgments versus 
decisions). The final change was to include a measure of 
participants’ dispositional confidence.
2
2
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evidence that the increase in confidence was not because of
an increase in accuracy.)
Anchoring effects
Seven estimates (<1% of the total estimates) were dropped
because they were extreme or likely typos. To confirm that
the anchors biased participants’ estimates, we first standard-
ized participants’ estimates. Then, we computed an average
of questions 1–3 (i.e., the questions that included a high
anchor for participants in the anchor condition) and an
average of questions 4–6 (i.e., the questions that included a
low anchor for participants in the anchor condition). An
independent-samples t-test on the average of questions 1–3
revealed that participants who saw a high anchor (M=0.41,
SD=0.57) gave higher estimates than participants who did
not see an anchor (M=0.38, SD=0.53), t(183) = 9.68,
p< .001, d=1.44. Similarly, an independent-samples t-test
examining the average of questions 4–6 revealed that
participants who saw a low anchor (M=0.19, SD=0.44)
gave lower estimates than participants who did not see an an-
chor (M=0.17, SD=0.74), t(183) = 3.98, p< .001, d=0.82.
In short, comparisons with a high anchor caused participants
to give higher estimates and comparisons with low anchors
caused people to give lower estimates than those participants
who did not see anchors.
Discussion
As predicted and consistent with Study 1, participants who
were exposed to externally provided anchors were more
confident in their estimates than participants who did not
see anchors. Participants’ estimates were also biased in the
direction of the anchors. Taken together, this again demon-
strates that participants who saw an anchor were more confi-
dent in their biased estimates.
STUDY 3
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that comparisons with anchors
can increase participants’ subjective feelings of confidence.
A question that remains from Studies 1 and 2 is why anchors
increase confidence. Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) as-
sumed that the increase in confidence occurred because
participants “…evidently treated the anchor as useful infor-
mation” (p. 1165). As described earlier, if people are given
information they deem as useful, it is quite likely that they
will be more confident in their estimates (Hall et al., 2007;
Tsai et al., 2008). Study 2 provides some evidence against
this explanation as the anchors were described as random
and arbitrary. However, it is possible that the participants
either did not pay attention to the description of the anchors
or the participants did not believe that the anchors uninfor-
mative to their estimate. Therefore, Study 2 does not entirely
rule out the explanation that anchors increase confidence
because people view them as useful information.
In Study 3, as with the previous studies, some participants
were presented with anchors while other participants did not
1982). These questions assess participants’ general confi-
dence in solving problems. Finally, participants were asked 
their age and gender, and debriefed.
Results
Confidence
Eight participants failed the instructions check and were 
dropped from the analyses (including these participants did 
not significantly change the overall results). We first per-
formed an independent-samples t-test on the average of par-
ticipants’ six confidence estimates. As predicted, participants 
in the anchor condition (M = 3.38, SD = 1.21) were more con-
fident in the accuracy of their estimates than participants in 
the no-anchor condition (M = 2.91, SD = 0.95), t(183) = 2.94, 
p = .004, d = 0.44. Next, we performed an ANCOVA on 
participants’ average confidence estimate while controlling 
for their dispositional confidence (i.e., their average score 
on the problem-solving confidence questions), age, and 
gender. Most importantly, participants who saw an anchor 
were more confident in their estimates than participants not 
exposed to an anchor, F(1, 180) = 7.12, p = .008, ηp = .038. 
Problem-solving confidence was a significant covariate, 
F(1, 180) = 3.75, p = .05, ηp = .020—participants who re-
ported higher levels of dispositional confidence were more 
confident in their estimates. Age, F(1, 180) = 1.84, p = .18, 
ηp = .010, and gender, F(1, 180) = 2.27, p = .13, ηp = .012, 
were not significant covariates.
An important question is whether the participants in the 
anchor condition should have been more confident than the 
no-anchor condition. That is, were participants in the anchor 
condition more likely to give estimates that were within 10%
of the actual answer, therefore warranting the increase in 
confidence? Overall, the anchor condition did give margin-
ally more estimates (M = 12.22%, SD = 12.44) within 10%
of the actual answer than participants in the no-anchor 
condition (M = 8.95%, SD = 11.86), t(183) = 1.83, p = .068, 
d = 0.27. However, for two of the questions (questions 1 
and 6 in Appendix B), the no-anchor condition provided a 
greater percentage of accurate estimates (p = .09 and 
p = .012), for two of the questions (questions 3 and 4) there 
was no significant difference between the two conditions 
(p = .12 and p = 1.00),5 and for the remaining two questions 
(questions 2 and 5), the anchor condition provided a greater 
percentage of accurate estimates (p = .013 and p = .011). 
Given the inconsistency across the questions, it seems 
unlikely that the increase in confidence arose because 
participants in the anchor condition knew they (sometimes) 
gave more accurate estimates. Finally, it is worth noting that 
an analysis restricted to those participants who did not give 
any estimates within 10% of the actual value still revealed 
that the anchor condition (M = 3.26, SD = 1.32) was more 
confident than the no-anchor condition (M = 2.71, SD = 0.91), 
t(90) = 2.37, p = .02, d = .51. (See Study 3 for additional
5No participants in either condition gave an estimate within 10% of the ac-
curate answer for the question about the number of Rolling Stones studio al-
bums that have gone platinum.
(Heppner & Petersen, 1982) and demographic questions
(age and gender). Finally, they were debriefed and thanked
for their participation.
Results
Confidence
We first averaged participants’ responses to the four
confidence questions. A one-way ANOVA on participants’
average confidence showed that confidence differed across
the no-anchor, random-anchor, and informative-anchor
conditions, F(2, 116) = 5.21, p= .007, ηp2 = .082. Post-hoc
analyses revealed that participants in the no-anchor condition
(M=2.35, SD=1.00) were less confident than participants in
the random-anchor (M=2.90, SD=1.04) and the informative-
anchor (M=3.01, SD=0.89) conditions (ps< .04). Partici-
pants in the random-anchor and informative-anchor
conditions did not significantly differ in their confidence
(p= .88). Next, we conducted an ANCOVA on participants’
average confidence while controlling for dispositional confi-
dence, age, and gender. Importantly, this analysis revealed
that the effect of the anchor condition remained significant,
F(2, 113) =4.95, p= .009, ηp2 = .080. Problem-solving
confidence, F(1, 113) = 0.78, p= .38, ηp2 = .007, and age,
F(1, 113) = 0.90, p= .35, ηp2 = .008, were not significant covar-
iates. Gender was a significant covariate, F(1, 113) = 5.46,
p= .02, ηp2 = .046, with males being more confident in their
estimates than females.
As in Study 2, we evaluated whether more people in the
anchor conditions gave estimates within 10% of the actual
estimates. Overall, there were no differences between the
no-anchor (M=33.75%, SD=12.08), random anchor (M=
35.53%, SD=16.06), and informative anchor (M=37.80%,
SD=16.88) conditions, F(2, 116) = 0.73, p= .48, ηp2 = .012.
When focusing on each question separately, there were no
differences between the conditions for three of the four
questions (p= .92, p=1.00, and p= .82, for questions 1, 2,
and 4 respectively). For question 3, more participants in the
informative anchor condition gave accurate estimates than
participants in the other two conditions (p= .023). An analysis
restricted to those participants who only gave one estimate
within 10% of the actual answer (all participants estimated
the start of the U.S. Civil War within 10%–161years—of
the actual start year so we could not use the same criteria as
in Study 2) revealed that participants in the random-anchor
(M=3.11, SD=0.99) and informative-anchor (M=3.02,
SD=0.78) conditions were more confident than participants
in the no-anchor condition (M=1.99, SD=0.79), F(2, 72) =
13.25, p< .001, ηp2 = .269.
To investigate whether the informativeness of the anchor
influenced confidence, the next analysis included only those
participants who were in one of the anchor conditions. We
conducted a 2 (anchor informativeness: random or informa-
tive) × 2 (anchor value: high or low) between-subjects
ANOVA on participants average confidence. This analysis
found no significant effects (see Figure 1). Specifically, there
was no effect of anchor informativeness, F(1, 75) = 0.17,
p= .67, ηp2 = .002, no effect of anchor value, F(1, 75) = 0.21,
see anchors. The important change was that the anchors were 
sometimes described to the participants as useful information 
and sometimes described as randomly generated values. If 
anchors increase confidence because people perceive the 
anchors as useful information, manipulating the perceived 
usefulness or informativeness of the anchors should influ-
ence participants’ confidence.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and nineteen students (79.0% female, 21.0%
male; Mage = 19.65, SDage = 3.96) from Appalachian State 
University participated as partial fulfillment of an under-
graduate research requirement. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the no-anchor, random-anchor, or informative-
anchor condition. Of those assigned to one of the anchor 
conditions, approximately half were randomly assigned to 
see high anchors and half were assigned to see low anchors.
Materials
Participants answered four question sets that each contained 
a comparative question that introduced the anchor, an 
absolute question, and a question that assessed confidence 
(see Appendix B). One change from Study 2 was that the con-
fidence question used did not ask participants their confidence 
that their estimate was within 10% of the actual answer. 
Instead, it simply asked participants to indicate their 
confidence in the accuracy of their estimate—again using a 
1 (not at all confident) to 7 (extremely confident) Likert-type 
response scale.
Procedure
After consenting to participate in the study, the participants 
were given instructions that differed slightly depending on 
their condition. All participants were told that they would 
be answering “general knowledge” questions and that they 
might not know the exact answers to the questions but should 
give their best guess. Participants in the informative-anchor 
and random-anchor conditions received additional instruc-
tion. Specifically, participants in the informative-anchor 
condition were told that before they make their estimate, they 
will see a number that, while not the correct answer to the 
question, might give a hint as to the actual answer. Partici-
pants in the random-anchor condition were told that, before 
they make their estimate, they will see a number that the 
computer has randomly picked and is, therefore, completely 
arbitrary. To further accentuate the perceived randomness 
of the anchors for participants in the random-anchor 
condition, before each question set, the participants saw text 
that said “For this round, the random number will be:”. After 
the text, a series of randomly generated numbers flashed 
briefly before the computer selected the anchor value—
apparently at random.
After reading the instructions, the participants saw the 
four question sets in a random order. Next, the participants 
completed the 11 problem-solving confidence questions
2
2
2
2
2
2
participants’ estimates, and the perceived informativeness of
the anchors influenced the magnitude of the anchoring effect.
Discussion
Study 3 once again demonstrated that participants who were
exposed to externally provided anchors were more confident
in their estimates than participants not exposed to anchors. It
seems unlikely that the increase in confidence is caused by
the anchors being perceived as informative because partici-
pants’ confidence did not differ across the random-anchor
and informative-anchor conditions. Because this conclusion
is based on a null effect (i.e., no significant difference in
confidence between the two anchor conditions), there are
alternative explanations. Perhaps participants did not pay
attention to the information we provided about the anchors
so we did not successfully manipulate the perceived in-
formativeness of the anchors. Or, perhaps participants in
the random-anchor condition perceived the anchors to be just
as useful as participants in the informative-anchor condition.
Examining participants’ estimates provides evidence against
both of these explanations. Specifically, the informativeness
of the anchor moderated the magnitude of the anchoring
effects. When the anchor was described as random, partici-
pants exhibited smaller anchoring effects than when it was
described as informative. Clearly, the participants paid
attention to the information about the anchors and it would
appear that participants in the informative anchor condition
used the anchors more when making their estimates than
did participants in the random-anchor condition. However,
the informativeness of the anchor did not influence partici-
pants’ levels of confidence.
STUDY 4
Study 3 ruled out the explanation that anchors increase con-
fidence because they are perceived as informative. Study 4
was designed to test the explanation that anchors increase
confidence because exposure to an anchor reduces the range
of values that people consider as plausible estimates of the
Figure 2. Participants’ average standardized estimate in Study 3 as a
function of anchor value and anchor informativeness. Error bars
represent ±1 standard error
Figure 1. Participants’ average confidence in Study 3 as a function 
of anchor value and anchor informativeness. Error bars represent
±1 standard error
p = .65, ηp = .003, and no interaction, F(1, 75) = 0.04, p = .84, 
ηp = .001.
Overall, the above analyses reveal that, relative to people 
who did not see an anchor, participants who saw an anchor 
were more confident in their estimate. However, the type of 
anchor (informative vs. random, high vs. low) did not affect 
confidence levels.
Anchoring effects
To investigate whether the anchors influenced participants’ 
estimates, we first standardized participants’ responses to 
the four absolute estimates, and then averaged together the 
four standardized values. A one-way ANOVA examining 
participants’ average standardized value across the low 
anchor, high anchor, and no anchor conditions revealed a 
significant effect of anchor condition, F(2, 116) = 41.35, 
p < .001, ηp = .416. Post-hoc analyses revealed that 
participants in the high anchor condition (M = 0.52, SD = 0.55) 
gave higher estimates than participants in the no anchor 
(M =0.17, SD = 0.44) and low anchor (M =0.37, SD = 0.37) 
conditions (ps < .001). Although in the predicted direction, 
participants’ estimates in the low and no anchor conditions 
did not significantly differ from one another (p = .14).
To investigate the influence of the informativeness of the 
anchor on participants’ estimates, we focused the next 
analysis on participants in the anchor conditions. We con-
ducted a 2 (anchor informativeness: random or informative) 
X 2 (anchor value: high or low) between-subjects ANOVA 
on participants’ average standardized estimates. This analysis 
revealed the expected anchoring effect; participants in the 
high anchor condition gave higher estimates than participants 
in the low anchor condition, F(1, 75) = 74.47, p < .001, 
ηp = .50. There was no main effect of anchor informativeness, 
F(1, 75) = 1.69, p = .20, ηp = .022. Importantly, there was a 
significant interaction, F(1, 75) = 7.01, p = .01, ηp = .085 
(see Figure 2). Participants in the informative anchor condi-
tion exhibited larger anchoring effects (i.e., a larger difference 
between high and low anchor estimates) than participants in 
the random anchor condition. In short, the anchors influenced
score indicated that participants considered a narrow range
of values. We then standardized these difference scores and
averaged together the difference scores for each question.
An independent-samples t-test revealed that the average
range was larger for those participants who did not see an an-
chor (M=0.17, SD=0.70) than for those who saw an anchor
(M=0.18, SD=0.46), t(87) = 2.84, p= .006, d=0.61. In
other words, participants who saw an anchor considered a
narrower range of values to be plausible responses than
participants who did not see an anchor value.
Anchoring effects
For each question, we computed the average of participants’
judgment about what they considered to be the highest
plausible value and the lowest plausible value. This average
value served as a proxy for participants’ estimate of the target
value. We then standardized these average values and
calculated the mean of the averages for each question. A
one-way ANOVA revealed that participants’ anchor condi-
tion (no anchor, low anchor, or high anchor) affected the
estimates they gave, F(2, 86) = 14.18, p< .001, ηp2 = .248.
Post-hoc analyses revealed that participants in the high an-
chor condition (M=0.46, SD=0.38) gave higher estimates
than participants in the no-anchor (M=0.09, SD=0.61)
and low anchor (M=0.31, SD=0.40) conditions (both
ps< .001). Although in the predicted direction, estimates
from participants in the no-anchor and low anchor condition
did not significantly differ from one another (p= .21).
Discussion
The results of Study 4 reveal that comparisons with anchors
affected the participants in two ways. First, the anchors influ-
enced the location of participants’ range of plausible values.
Participants in the high anchor considered higher values than
participants in the no and low anchor conditions. Second,
comparisons with anchors decreased the range of values the
participants considered to be plausible. Taken together with
the previous studies, this suggests that comparisons with
anchors increase confidence by decreasing the range of
values that participants consider to be plausible estimates of
the target.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The studies described above had two goals—identify
whether externally provided anchors can influence subjective
levels of confidence and test explanations for this finding.
Studies 1 and 2 established that comparisons with anchors
increase the subjective levels of confidence that people have
in their estimates. This is particularly troubling considering
that comparisons with anchors also biased participants
estimates. The increase in confidence was observed when
providing estimates with no objectively correct response
(Study 1) as well as when providing estimates with objectively
correct responses (Study 2). The effects were observed when
controlling for other variables that can impact confidence
target value. Presumably, considering a wide range of values 
would lead to less confidence than considering a more 
narrow range of values.
Method
Participants and design
Eighty-nine students (79.8% female, 20.2% male; Mage = 
19.60, SDage = 2.84) from Appalachian State University 
participated as partial fulfillment of undergraduate research 
requirements. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
no-anchor or anchor condition. Of those assigned to the an-
chor condition, approximately half were randomly assigned 
to see high anchors and half were assigned to see low anchors.
Materials
Participants answered four question sets that each contained a 
comparative question that introduced the anchor, a question 
that assessed the lowest plausible response, and a question 
that assessed the highest plausible response (see Appendix B).
Procedure
After consenting to participate, the participants were given 
instructions regarding their task. Specifically, they were told 
that they would be asked a number of general knowledge 
questions, they likely would not know the exact answers to 
each question, but that they might have a sense as to the 
range of possible values. They were told that their task was 
to indicate their range of possible values for each question 
and were given an example to ensure they understand their 
task (see Appendix D for the exact instructions). After 
reading their instructions, participants in the anchor condi-
tion were asked to compare the target value with an anchor 
(e.g., “Do you think the top speed of a 2013 Porsche Boxter 
S is faster or slower than 110 miles per hour?”). Next, they 
indicated what they considered to be the lowest plausible 
value of the target (e.g., “What is the lowest plausible value 
for the top speed of a 2013 Porsche Boxter S?”). Finally, they 
indicated what they considered to be the highest plausible 
value of the target (e.g., “What is the highest plausible value 
for the top speed of a 2013 Porsche Boxter S?”). Participants 
in the no-anchor condition only responded to the lowest and 
highest plausible value questions. The four question sets 
were presented in a random order. After answering the four 
question sets the participants were asked their age and 
gender, debriefed, and dismissed.
Results
Range of plausible values
A small number of responses (12/712 or 1.69%) were 
dropped because they were imprecise (e.g., “about 150–
160”) or were likely typos. For each question, we computed 
the difference between participants’ judgment about what 
they considered to be the highest plausible value and the 
lowest plausible value. Therefore, a high score indicated that 
participants considered a wider range of values and a low
Specifically, in three of their studies (Studies 3, 4, and 6), they
had participants estimate a quantity (e.g., the height—in
inches—of a standard soft-drink can) and then provide confi-
dence ranges. Importantly, some participants were given an
estimate from another participant (an anchor) before provid-
ing their estimate and giving the confidence range. Across
all three studies, participants in the anchor condition were
no more likely to give confidence ranges that included the
true value as compared to participants in the no anchor
condition—that is, they were no more accurate. However, in
two of the three studies, participants in the anchor condition
gave more narrow confidence ranges than no-anchor
participants—suggesting they were more confident. It is
important to note that, combining across the three studies,
confidence ranges were not significantly narrower for
participants in the anchor condition.
While not entirely consistent with our studies, the re-
search by Block and Harper (1991) suggests that anchors
might influence overprecision—one objective measure of
overconfidence. There are a number of reasons why their
studies found results that were not fully consistent with our
research (e.g., describing the anchors as having come from
another participant). Perhaps the most important difference
is that we focused on subjective measures of confidence
while Block and Harper examined an objective measure of
confidence. Therefore, future research is needed to explicitly
compare these distinct types of confidence measures. In addi-
tion to examining objective measures of confidence, future
research could also examine other factors that might moder-
ate the relationship between anchors and confidence. In the
two studies conducted by Block and Harper (1991) that
showed a difference between the anchor and no-anchor
conditions, participants gave 50% confidence intervals, while
in the study that showed no difference, participants gave 90%
confidence intervals. Perhaps one reason for the different
results across the studies was the different confidence
intervals. (e.g., 50% vs. 90% confidence intervals).
Understanding the differences between subjective and
objective measures of confidence is certainly important.
However, there are many contexts where there are no objec-
tively correct judgments. Therefore, focusing on subjective
measures of confidence is also a potentially fruitful avenue
for future research. In the next section, we describe a number
of these domains and speculate how comparisons with
anchors might influence people’s judgments and decisions.
Practical implications and future directions
Anchoring effects have been observed in a wide variety of
situations. As mentioned earlier—and as demonstrated in
Study 1—anchors can influence mock jurors’ damages
awards (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Marti & Wissler,
2000). The finding that anchors not only bias judgments
but also increase confidence could be a concern because
jurors who are more confident in their recommendation
might be less willing to entertain alternative recommenda-
tions. Once a juror makes a recommendation that he or she
is relatively confident in, he or she might be hesitant to revise
the recommendation. This seems particularly problematic if
6We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to this
research.
(i.e., dispositional problem solving confidence, age, and gen-
der). The finding that anchors increased confidence would 
not be problematic if anchors also increased accuracy. How-
ever, participants who saw anchors generally gave estimates 
that were no more accurate than participants who did not see 
anchors.
Studies 3 and 4 tested two explanations for why compar-
isons with anchors increased participants’ confidence. Study 
3 found that, contrary to the prediction based on the explana-
tion provided by Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995), anchors 
increased confidence regardless of whether the anchors were 
described as informative or not. The informativeness 
manipulation did, however, influence the magnitude of the 
anchoring effect. Study 4 found that comparisons with an-
chors decreased the range of values participants considered 
when providing their estimates. This finding provides sup-
port for the explanation that anchors increase confidence by 
narrowing the range of values people consider while forming 
their impression of the target. Presumably, participants who 
consider a wider range of values—a sign of uncertainty—
will be less confident than participants who consider a 
narrower range of values.
In the studies described above, we found that externally 
provided anchors biased people’s estimates, but also 
increased the confidence they had in these estimates. This 
finding is partially inconsistent with research by De Neys 
et al. (2011) who found that—in a different context—when 
participants were biased, they were less confident in their 
estimates. As mentioned earlier, De Neys et al. (2011) 
explained this decrease in confidence by suggesting that par-
ticipants were aware their estimates were biased and adjusted 
their confidence to reflect this knowledge. Anchoring effects, 
however, appear to at least partially operate outside of 
people’s awareness. For example, a number of studies have 
demonstrated that forewarning participants about the biasing 
influence of anchors does not reduce anchoring effects from 
externally provided anchors (e.g., see Epley & Gilovich, 
2005; Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). If people 
do not realize their estimates are biased by the anchors, they 
will not adjust their confidence.
Subjective vs. objective measures of confidence
In the current studies, participants indicated their subjective 
levels of confidence in their estimates. One limitation of this 
approach is that we cannot assess whether participants were 
over- or underconfident. Our studies demonstrate that anchors 
increase confidence while not systematically increasing accu-
racy. However, it is possible that participants in the no-anchor 
conditions were less confident than they should be. Therefore, 
providing participants with an anchor might increase their 
confidence to a more appropriate level. One way to address 
this concern would be to present participants with an anchor 
or not and then assess confidence in a way that can be 
objectively evaluated. Block and Harper (1991) did just that.6
generating confidence intervals influences the size of the
intervals (Juslin, Wennerholm, & Olsson, 1999; Selvidge,
1980; Soll & Klayman, 2004). In these studies, making an
estimate—which could be viewed as a self-generated an-
chor—generally increased the size of confidence intervals.
That is, people appear to be less confident when they make
an initial estimate as compared to when they do not.
Although there are a number of differences between these
studies and the studies described in the current manuscript,
it is possible that self-generate anchors might decrease confi-
dence while externally provided anchors increase confidence.
Therefore, an avenue for future research would be to com-
pare the influence of these two types of anchors on people’s
confidence in their estimates.
Conclusion
Anchors can have a powerful influence on people’s numeric
estimates. It has long been known that numeric anchors can
bias people’s estimates (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
The current studies demonstrate that anchors can also
increase people’s subjective levels of confidence in their
estimates. This, of course, compounds the effect of the
anchors because the factor that is increasing people’s confi-
dence is also causing their estimate to be biased. Furthermore,
the biasing influence of anchors was observed with anchors
that were informative as well as those that were clearly
uninformative. While future research is needed to investigate
the practical implications of the current findings, it is now
clear that comparisons with anchors lead people to be confi-
dently biased.
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APPENDIX A: TRIAL INFORMATION
The Plaintiff: Kathy, a 32-year-old housewife, was diag-
nosed with ovarian cancer. Since it was detected late, doctors
had to remove both ovaries. The operation involved major
surgery that required a week-long stay in the hospital.
Because both ovaries were removed, Kathy is consequently
unable to have children. Although they did not yet have
any, she and her husband were planning on having children.
Late detection also means that Kathy’s prognosis is poor.
The cancer has spread since the surgery, which was two years
ago.Kathy is almost constantly in pain, and her life expectancy
has certainly been reduced. Because of her poor health, Kathy
has been too weak to spend much time with friends or family
members, and she has been unable to enjoy most of her favor-
ite activities, such as biking, writing poetry, and traveling.
The Defendant: Kathy is suing her health care provider,
the Greater Community Health Maintenance Organization
the juror comes up with an award recommendation before all 
the information in a case has been evaluated or before the 
juror has had an opportunity to discuss his or her recommen-
dation with the other jurors.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that in negotiations, 
first offers can act as anchors (e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 
2001; Galinsky, Ku, & Mussweiler, 2009; Loschelder, 
Stuppi, & Trötschel, 2014). Specifically, the outcomes of 
the negotiations are often biased in the direction of the first 
offers. Interestingly, the current studies suggest that, while 
the anchors bias the outcomes, they might also increase the 
negotiators’ confidence that they are ending with a good 
deal. This could partially account for why the first offers 
can be so powerful. If, for example, a seller of a product 
provides the first offer, the buyer’s counteroffer will likely 
be biased by this first offer. At the same time, the first offer 
might increase the buyer’s confidence that his or her counter-
offer is a reasonable offer. This seems likely to increase the 
likelihood that the buyer would accept a final offer that is 
close to the initial offer. Future research could investigate 
whether a first offer can not only bias counteroffers, but also 
increase people’s confidence in their biased counteroffer.
Another context that anchoring effects have been 
observed is with doctors’ estimates of the likelihood of a 
particular diagnosis (Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz, & Bergus, 
2007). In one study, physicians were asked to estimate the 
likelihood that a hypothetical patient had a pulmonary embo-
lism after seeing a high or low anchor. Physicians who saw a 
low anchor gave estimates that were much lower than 
physicians who saw a high anchor. Interestingly, Brewer 
et al. found that the anchors did not influence the physicians’ 
treatment options. The current studies suggest that, while the 
treatment options did not vary, the anchors likely increased 
the confidence that the physicians had in their estimates of 
the likelihood that the patient had a pulmonary embolism. 
It seems likely that physicians who are more confident in 
their estimate would also be more confident in their treatment 
recommendation. Therefore, it is possible that these 
physicians would be less likely to question their diagnosis 
and less likely to entertain alternative treatments. This line 
of reasoning is, of course, speculation at this point. Future 
studies could investigate whether providing anchors—
relative to not providing anchors—not only increase physi-
cians’ confidence in their estimates, but also confidence in 
their recommended treatment. Furthermore, future research 
could examine whether this increase in confidence is associ-
ated with a reluctance to entertain alternative diagnoses or 
alternative treatments.
Finally, it is worth noting that the current studies exam-
ined how externally provided anchors influence confidence. 
A number of studies have examined differences between 
self-generated and externally provided anchors (e.g., Epley 
& Gilovich, 2001, 2005; Simmons, LeBoeuf, & Nelson, 
2010). Although it is unclear whether anchoring effects from 
these two types of anchors are produced by different 
mechanisms (Epley & Gilovich, 2001) or not (Simmons 
et al., 2010), it is possible that these two different anchor 
types differentially influence confidence. A number of 
studies have examined how making an estimate before
Question
Low
anchor
High
anchor
Low
anchor
estimate
No anchor
estimate
High
anchor
estimate
If you were
a juror,
how much
money
would you
recommend
the plaintiff
receive for
her pain
and
suffering?
50 000 5 000 000 366 494
(1 193 091)
1 461 435
(2 773 673)
2 535 924
(2 126 960)
Study 2
# Question
Correct
answer
Low
anchor
High
anchor
Low
anchor
estimate
No
anchor
estimate
High
anchor
estimate
1 How many
calories
are in a
Twinkie?
135 — 350 — 230.11
(100.24)
337.56
(117.84)
2 How
many
Grammy
awards has
Beyoncé
won?
17 — 26 — 5.58
(3.43)
13.18
(7.14)
3 How many
horsepower
does a
2014 Ford
Mustang
GT have?
420 — 500 — 407.68
(389.29)
510.83
(190.52)
4 How many
Rolling
Stones
studio
albums
have gone
platinum?
29 5 — 7.90
(3.74)
8.06
(4.05)
—
5 How many
countries
are in
South
America
13 6 — 13.02
(5.79)
19.02
(11.12)
—
6 What
is the
population
of
Greensboro,
North
Carolina?
249 300 45 000 — 137 702
(173 679)
257 324
(370 302)
—
Study 3
# Question
Correct
answer
Low
anchor
High
anchor
Low
anchor
estimate
No
anchor
estimate
High
anchor
estimate
1 What is
the top
speed of
a 2012
Porsche
Boxter S?
172 110 210 159.32
(30.72)
188.78
(44.78)
212.20
(43.23)
2 In what
year did
the U.S.
Civil War
start?
1861 1810 1920 1843.00
(45.80)
1861.45
(58.23)
1879.29
(53.57)
3 How
many
countries
are in
Africa?
58 25 70 38.84
(19.75)
32.50
(24.49)
55.80
(30.38)
4 How
many
studio
albums
has the
band U2
released?
12 7 27 7.74
(4.06)
8.05
(7.94)
18.46
(9.93)
(HMO), who prescribed her birth control pills, claiming that 
they knowingly prescribed her unsafe birth control pills. 
Although several brands of birth control pills are available, 
Kathy’s HMO has a policy of prescribing this particular 
brand because of its low cost. Kathy had been prescribed this 
particular brand of pills for approximately 5 years.
Evidence Presented At The Trial: An expert witness for the 
plaintiff testified that there is considerable variability among 
different birth control pills. Although the federal government 
sets guidelines, it leaves drug companies some leeway in de-
signing their own product. Before the plaintiff had been pre-
scribed the birth control pills, the expert witness conducted a 
study where she gave female laboratory rats doses of the con-
tents of the pills that the plaintiff was prescribed for a period of 
one year. She then evaluated their health on a variety of mea-
sures and compared to lab rats who did not receive the pills. 
Rats that took the birth control pill used by the plaintiff devel-
oped five times more health complications than the rats who 
did not receive the pills. The expert witness concluded that 
the pills could lead to similar health problems, including ovar-
ian cancer, in humans. Furthermore, the expert pointed out 
that the vast majority of doctors stopped prescribing this type 
of pill once the results of her study were made public. The de-
fendant, however, continued to prescribe the pills.
The defendant argued that, because the study was 
conducted on rats and not on humans, there was no evidence 
that the pills would increase the risk of cancer for the plaintiff.
Trial Results: The defendant (Greater Community HMO) 
was found to be guilty of knowingly prescribing unsafe pills 
to the plaintiff (Kathy).
Current Issue: Because the defendant was found guilty, 
they are liable for damages. The plaintiff is asking for [a 
monetary award; $50 000; $5 000 000] to compensate for 
her pain, suffering, and emotional distress. Her medical bills 
were completely covered by insurance, and because she did 
not have a job, she did not lose any income. So, in this case, 
compensatory damages are only to compensate the plaintiff 
for pain and suffering.
APPENDIX B: ALL QUESTIONS AND ANCHORS 
USED IN ALL STUDIES, ALONG WITH THE AVERAGE 
(AND SD) ESTIMATES.
Study 1
Study 4
Low anchor No anchor High anchor
# Question Low
anchor
High
anchor
Lowest
plausible
Highest
plausible
Lowest
plausible
Highest
plausible
Lowest
plausible
Highest
plausible
1 What is the lowest [highest] plausible value for the
top speed of a 2013 Porsche Boxter S?
110 210 116.96
(27.87)
165.87
(36.48)
127.12
(58.95)
196.51
(52.90)
166.96
(52.87)
231.96
(56.98)
2 What is the lowest [highest] plausible value for the
year the U.S. Civil War started?
1810 1920 1820.64
(46.15)
1859.86
(43.49)
1813.51
(65.10)
1866.26
(61.36)
1848.09
(58.66)
1885.30
(51.61)
3 What is the lowest [highest] plausible value for the
number of countries in Africa?
25 70 28.87
(16.08)
50.43
(35.00)
28.93
(45.77)
68.74
(71.48)
36.17
(19.65)
57.09
(22.05)
4 What is the lowest [highest] plausible value for the
number of studio albums released by the band U2?
7 27 6.00
(2.09)
10.83
(4.24)
4.64
(3.67)
16.38
(11.70)
11.22
(7.77)
20.74
(10.41)
APPENDIX C: INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO PARTICI-
PANTS IN STUDY 2 REGARDING PROVIDING AN
ESTIMATE WITHIN 10% OF THE ACTUAL ANSWER.
“After you give your estimates, you will be asked to indicate
your confidence that your estimate is within 10% of the ac-
tual answer. For example, imagine that you gave an estimate
of 120 for some value, and the actual value was 100. In this
situation, ‘within 10% of the actual value’ would be in the
range of 90–110, so your answer did not fall within 10% of
the actual value. On the other hand, if you gave an estimate
of 95, this answer does fall within 10% of the actual answer.
It does not matter if your estimate is above or below the
actual value, just that it is within the 10% range.”
APPENDIX D: INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO PARTICI-
PANTS IN STUDY 4 REGARDING ESTIMATES OF THE
HIGHEST AND LOWEST PLAUSIBLE VALUES.
“For example, you might not know the exact population of
Greensboro, NC. However, you might think that the
population is sure to be more than 100 000 people. That is,
you think the lowest plausible value is 100 000. You might
also think that the population is sure to be less than 600 000
people. That is, you think the highest plausible value is
600 000. Therefore, even though you don’t know the exact
population of Greensboro, if your range of values is from
100000 to 600 000 people, you assume that the exact value
falls somewhere in this range.”
REFERENCES
Block, R. A., & Harper, D. R. (1991). Overconfidence in estima-
tion: Testing the anchoring-and-adjustment hypothesis. Organi-
zational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 49(2),
188–207. 10.1016/0749-5978(91)90048-X.
Brewer, N. T., Chapman, G. B., Schwartz, J. A., & Bergus, G. R.
(2007). The influence of irrelevant anchors on the judgments
and choices of doctors and patients. Medical Decision Making,
27, 203–211.
Chapman, G. B., & Bornstein, B. H. (1996). The more you ask for,
the more you get: Anchoring in personal injury verdicts. Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 10, 519–540. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0720(199612)10:6&lt;519::AID-ACP417&gt;3.0.CO;2-5
De Neys, W., Cromheeke, S., & Osman, M. (2011). Biased but in
doubt: Conflict and decision confidence. PLoS ONE,
6(1e15954). 10.1371/journal.pone.0015954.
Englich, B., Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2006). Playing dice with
criminal sentences: The influence of irrelevant anchors on
experts’ judicial decision making. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 32, 188–200. 10.1177/0146167205282152.
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2001). Putting adjustment back in the
anchoring and adjustment heuristic: Differential processing of
self-generated and experimenter-provided anchors. Psychologi-
cal Science, 12, 391–396. 10.1111/1467-9280.00372.
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2005). When effortful thinking influ-
ences judgmental anchoring: Differential effects of forewarning
and incentives on self-generated and externally-provided
anchors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 199–212.
10.1002/bdm.495.
Galinsky, A. D., Ku, G., & Mussweiler, T. (2009). To start low or to
start high? The case of auctions versus negotiations. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 18(6), 357–361. 10.1111/
j.1467-8721.2009.01667.x.
Galinsky, A. D., & Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as anchors:
The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 81(4), 657–669. 10.1037/
0022-3514.81.4.657.
Hall, C. C., Ariss, L., & Todorov, A. (2007). The illusion of knowl-
edge: When more information reduces accuracy and increases
confidence. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 103(2), 277–290. 10.1016/j.obhdp.2007.01.003.
Heppner, P. P., & Petersen, C. H. (1982). The development and
implications of a personal problem-solving inventory. Journal
of Counseling Psychology, 29(1), 66–75. 10.1037/0022-
0167.29.1.66.
Jacowitz, K. E., & Kahneman, D. (1995). Measures of anchoring in
estimation tasks. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
21, 1161–1166. 10.1177/01461672952111004.
Juslin, P., Wennerholm, P., & Olsson, H. (1999). Format depen-
dence in subjective probability calibration. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25(4),
1038–1052.
Loschelder, D. D., Stuppi, J., & Trötschel, R. (2014). ‘€14,875?!’:
Precision boosts the anchoring potency of first offers. Social
Psychological and Personality Science, 5(4), 491–499.
10.1177/1948550613499942.
Marti, M. W., & Wissler, R. L. (2000). Be careful what you ask for:
The effect of anchors on personal-injury damages awards.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 6, 91–103.
10.1037/1076-898X.6.2.91.
Moore, D. A., & Healy, P. J. (2008). The trouble with overconfi-
dence. Psychological Review, 115(2), 502–517. 10.1037/0033-
295X.115.2.502.
Mussweiler, T., & Englich, B. (2003). Adapting to the Euro:
Evidence from bias reduction. Journal of Economic Psychology,
24, 285–292.
Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (1999). Hypothesis-consistent testing
and semantic priming in the anchoring paradigm: A selective
accessibility model. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
35, 136–164. 10.1006/jesp.1998.1364.
Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2000a). The use of category and
exemplar knowledge in the solution of anchoring tasks. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 1038–1052. 10.1037/
0022-3514.78.6.1038.
Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2000b). Numeric judgments under
uncertainty: The role of knowledge in anchoring. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 495–518. 10.1006/
jesp.1999.1414.
Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1987). Experts, amateurs, and
real estate: An anchoring-and-adjustment perspective on
property pricing decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human
DecisionProcesses, 39, 84–97. 10.1016/0749-5978(87)90046-X.
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instruc-
tional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase
statistical power. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
45, 867–872. 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.03.009.
Selvidge, J. E. (1980). Assessing the extremes of probability
distributions by the fractile method. Decision Sciences, 11(3),
493–502.
Simmons, J. P., LeBoeuf, R. A., & Nelson, L. D. (2010). The effect
of accuracy motivation on anchoring and adjustment: Do people
adjust from provided anchors? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 99(6), 917–932. 10.1037/a0021540.
Smith, A. R., & Windschitl, P. D. (2015). Resisting anchoring
effects: The roles of metric and mapping knowledge.
Memory & Cognition, 43(7), 1071–1084. 10.3758/s13421-
015-0524-4.
Smith, A. R., Windschitl, P. D., & Bruchmann, K. (2013). Knowl-
edge matters: Anchoring effects are moderated by knowledge
level. European Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 97–108.
10.1002/ejsp.1921.
Soll, J. B., & Klayman, J. (2004). Overconfidence in interval esti-
mates. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 30(2), 299–314.
Tsai, C. I., Klayman, J., & Hastie, R. (2008). Effects of amount of
information on judgment accuracy and confidence. Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 107(2),
97–105. 10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.01.005.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty:
Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. 10.1126/
science.185.4157.1124.
Wilson, T. D., Houston, C. E., Etling, K. M., & Brekke, N. (1996).
A new look at anchoring effects: Basic anchoring and its
antecedents. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
125, 387–402. 10.1037/0096-3445.125.4.387.
Yates, F., & Potworowski, G. A. (2012). Evidence-based decision
management. In D. M. Rousseau (Ed.), The Oxford handbook
of evidence-based management (pp. 198–222). Newsssss York,
NY: Oxford University Press.
